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DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC
RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY
RULE IN FEDERAL AND NEW YORK PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION
Imagine hundreds of public officials, including police officers,
interrupted from their administration of public affairs, appearing
in court daily to testify at trial about the subject matter of their
reports and records, because they feared that the reports alone
would be inadmissible hearsay. 1 The federal courts have. 2 In
order to resolve the inconvenience, common law developed an
exception to the hearsay rule for written records and reports of
public officials. 3 While hearsay has and always will be a weapon
1. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(C).
2. See Wong Wing Foo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 120, 123 (9th Cir. 1952)
("A further necessity [for admitting a public record into evidence] lies in the
inconvenience of calling to the witness stand all over the country government
officers who have made in the course of their duties thousands of similar
written hearsay statements concerning events coming within their
jurisdictions."); Genitle v. County of Suffolk, 129 F.R.D. 435, 448
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("It would be almost impossible to require individual
investigators to appear in court to testify any time the results of an
investigation were probative of issues in individual litigation."), afrd, 926
F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
3. See, e.g., Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472. 570 (1851). Justice
Wayne set forth the principle behind admitting public records into evidence
without having the public official testify:
IPublic records] are admissible in evidence on account of their public
nature, though their authenticity be not confirmed by the usual tests of
truth; namely, the swearing and the cross-examination of the persons
who prepared them. They are entitled to this extraordinary degree of
confidence, partly because they are required by law to be kept. partly
because their contents are of public interest and notoriety, but
principally because they are made under the sanction of an oath of
office, or at least under that of official duty. by accredited agents
appointed for that purpose . . ..
Id.; People v. Hoats, 102 Misc. 2d 1004, 1010, 425 N.Y.S.2d 497. 501
(County Ct. Monroe County 1980) ("Under the common law exception, when
1
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used by attorneys to object to an unsworn written document
offered into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted, 4 the
public records exception to the hearsay rule5 diminishes the
strength of these objections.
The impetus for the development of a hearsay exception for
public documents 6 is based on the presumption that a public
official is obligated to perform his official duties properly. 7 For
convenience and efficiency, it is also necessary to admit into
a public officer is authorized by the nature of his official duty to keep records
of transactions occurring in the course of his duty, the record so made by
him . . . is admissible in evidence.").
4. See People v. Violante, 144 A.D.2d 995, 534 N.Y.S.2d 281 (4th
Dep't 1988) (objecting to the receipt of an autopsy report where examiner who
prepared report was available to testify); In re Zurich-American Ins. Co., 89
A.D.2d 542, 452 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1st Dep't 1982) (opposing admission of
report by Department of Motor Vehicles as hearsay); In re Eighth Judicial
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 152 Misc. 2d 338, 576 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1991) (opposing admission of Environmental Protection Agency report
into evidence because of hearsay).
5. See FED. R. EvID. 803(8) (federal public records exception); see also
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4250 (McKinney 1992) (New York public records
exception).
6. Public documents are defined as "any document or record, evidencing
or connected with the public business or the administration of public affairs,
preserved in or issued by any department of the government." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 482 (6th ed. 1990).
7. See Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 123,
128-29 (1919). The Court stated that:
ITIheir character as public records required by law to be kept, the
official character of their contents entered under the sanction of public
duty, the obvious necessity for regular contemporaneous entries in them
and the reduction to a minimum of motive on the part of public officials
and employees to either make false entries or to omit proper ones, all
unite to make these books lof the Treasury Department]
admissible ....
Id.; People v. Garneau, 120 A.D.2d 112, 116, 507 N.Y.S.2d 931, 935 (4th
Dep't 1986) (stating that the common law exception is based on "a public
official's lack of motive to distort the truth when recording a fact or event in
discharge of public duty").
[Vol 11
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evidence a report made by a public official without having that
public official testify. 8
However, simply recognizing the necessity for a public records
exception to the hearsay rule does not mean that this exception is
utilized in the same fashion in both the federal and New York
State courts. 9 This Comment will specifically target the
differences in how federal and New York courts address similar
issues relating to the public records exception. First, in order to
appreciate the distinctions between the federal and New York
public records exception to the hearsay rule, this Comment will
include a brief overview of the rules of evidence that apply in
both federal and New York practice when a party seeks to admit
an official document into evidence. 10 Second, the differences
between federal and New York practice in receiving public
documents into evidence without disturbing the hearsay rule will
be examined, 11 as well as the practical effects that arise from
their respective treatment. 12 Third, this Comment will suggest
that New York adopt the public records exception set forth in the
1991-92 Proposed Code of Evidence. 13 In conclusion, this
Comment will state that New York's evidentiary rules for
receiving public records into evidence under the public records
exception may lead to some serious implications which the
applicable federal rules seem to avoid. The consequences of New
York's actions stem from a misunderstanding of the basic
justification for such an exception, namely the trustworthiness of
such reports.
8. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 295, at 508 (John William Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992). Given the volume of business in public offices, most reports are
made "routinely and mechanically." United States v. Agustino-Hernandez, 14
F.3d 42, 43 (11th Cir. 1994).
9. See infra notes 70-197 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 14-69 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 70-166 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 167-197 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
1994]
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I. THE EVIDENTIARY RULES PERTAINING TO
PUBLIC RECORDS
A. Federal Rules of Evidence
Although a hearsay exception for public records exists in
common law, 14 admissibility of public reports in federal courts
are now governed by statute. 15 Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which is now applicable to the admissibility of
public records and reports, classifies public records into three
groups. 16 The rule does not distinguish between federal and
nonfederal offices and only requires that the record is one of a
public body. 17 The creation of Rule 803(8) is based on the
assumption that public officials will perform their duties properly
and that they lack a motive to falsify. 18
The first group of records that are exempt from the hearsay
rule include those records and reports of the activities of the
14. See cases cited supra note 3 and accompanying text.
15. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). Rule 803(8) provides in pertinent part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(8) Public records and reports.
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the
office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed
by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding,
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and
other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and
proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
805 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1986) (explaining the presumption that public
officials perform their duty without private motives).
[Vol 11
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office itself. 19 Examples of this type of record include receipts
and books of the Department of Treasury, 20 general land office
records, 2 1 pension office records, 22 and other governmental
agency reports. 23
The second group of records which are admissible as a hearsay
exception incorporate those matters observed and reported by
public officials pursuant to the law in which there is a duty to
report, 24 with exception to matters observed by police officers or
other law enforcement personnel in criminal cases. 25 Public
records and reports falling within this group include warrants of
deportation, 26 computer reports of stolen cars, 27 and weather
19. FED. R. EVID. 803 (8)(A). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
20. Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 123 (1919)
(holding that books from the Department of Treasury are admissible hearsay at
trial).
21. Howard v. Perrin, 200 U.S. 71 (1906). In Howard, the Court upheld
the admission of certified copies of records filed in the General Land Office.
1d. at 73. The court explained that "[t]he certificate of the local land officers
was competent to show that on the records of their office were no homestead,
preemption or other valid claims, and that the land had not been returned or
denominated as swamp or mineral land." Id.
22. Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187, 191-92 (1895) (admitting page
from records of Pension Office into evidence because properly authenticated).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 722 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1983). In
Johnson, the Eighth Circuit held that a serial number report made by the
manufacturer of the defendant's firearm, but possessed by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, was admissible. Id. at 409. -Clearly the
information in the report was not a matter 'observed by law enforcement
personnel.' Neither was it a factual finding 'resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by the law.'" Id. at 410. The court held
that the report was admissible since it was kept in a "ministerial fashion" by a
public agency. Id.; United States v. Stone, 604 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding public records admissible under Rule 803(8)(A)).
24. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977). In Oates, the
Second Circuit construed the phrase in Rule 803(8)(B) "other law enforcement
personnel" to mean "any officer or employee of a governmental agency which
has law enforcement responsibilities." Id. at 68. Accordingly, the court held
that full time chemists employed by the United States Customs Service would
satisfy the requirement of "other law enforcement personnel." Id.
26. United States v. Agustino-Hernandez, 14 F.3d 42. 43 (1 1th Cir. 1994)
("We hold that admission of routinely and mechanically kept I.N.S.
1994]
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bureau records. 2 8 The purpose behind Rule 803(8)(B) was to
exempt those records routinely observed by public officials in a
civil action or against the government in a criminal case. 29
An important aspect of Rule 803(8)(B) involves the
introduction of public records in criminal cases. Rule 803(8)(B)
does not allow for the admission of public records containing
matters which are observed by public officials and recorded
pursuant to the law in a criminal case. 30 Although a few circuit
courts have held that public records, including police reports, can
be used against a criminal defendant where the report was
"prepared in a routine non adversarial setting," 31 the majority of
circuits have not admitted at trial such reports in accordance with
Rule 803(8)(B) when that report entails a "more subjective
investigation and evaluation of a crime." 32
The third group of public records known as "investigative
reports," provide for the admission in civil actions and against
the government in criminal cases, of "factual findings resulting
from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law,
records ... does not violate Rule 803(8)(B)."); United States v. Quezada, 754
F.2d 1190, 1195 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding that warrant of deportation
does not violate Rule 803(8)(B)).
27. United States v. Enterline, 894 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that
computer report identifying stolen car qualifies under Rule 803(8)(B)).
28. Minnehaha County v. Kelley, 150 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1945) (holding
weather bureau records indicating rainfall admissible at trial).
29. See United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 968-70 n.24 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (discussing history behind Rule 803(8)(B)).
30. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 9 F.3d 907, 911-12 (1lth Cir.
1993) (per curiam) (holding that there were no hearsay concerns for public
records used against a criminal defendant where the "custodian ... had no
incentive to do anything other than mechanically record the relevant
information . . ").
32. See United States v. Enterline, 894 F.2d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 1990)
("Such [police] observations [at the scene of a crimel are potentially unreliable
since they are made in an adversary setting, and are often subjective
evaluations of whether a crime was committed."); United States v. Orozco,
590 F.2d 789, 794 (9th Cir.) ("In adopting this exception [to criminal cases],
Congress was concerned about prosecutors attempting to prove their cases in
chief simply by putting into evidence police officers' reports of their
contemporaneous observations of crime."), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979).
200 [Vol 11
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unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness." 33 Investigative reports, the most
controversial of public records, 34 allow for the admissibility of
public records or police reports where the records are reliable
and trustworthy. 35 The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Evidence set forth particular factors to be considered when
determining the trustworthiness of investigative reports. 36 Such
factors include "(1) the timeliness of the investigation . . . (2) the
special skill or experience of the official ... (3) whether a
hearing was held and the level at which it was conducted . .
.[and] (4) possible motivation problems suggested by Palmer i.
Hoffman37 .... "38 Thus, when utilizing Rule 803(8)(C), courts
primarily focus on the trustworthiness of the investigative
report.39 Moreover, the burden of establishing a basis for
33. FED. R. EviD. 803(8)(C). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
34. See FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note. The advisory
committee's note states that the disagreement among the circuit court decisions
on the issue of whether to admit evaluative reports into evidence "has been due
in part, no doubt, to the variety of situations encountered, as well as to
differences in principle." Id.
35. See, e.g., Simmons v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 993
F.2d 1326, 1328 (8th Cir. 1993) (admitting investigative police report into
evidence under Rule 803(8)(C) because investigation was timely, police officer
was experienced and had objective state of mind); Bank of Lexington & Trust
Co. v. Vining-Sparks Sec., Inc., 959 F.2d 606, 617 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding
that letters of caution written by the NASD were trustworthy and thus
admissible); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465, 1472
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (determining that New Zealand report regarding findings on
chiropractics in its nation was not trustworthy "because its conclusions [were]
based upon otherwise inadmissible, unreliable evidence collected and evaluated
by persons with no particular skill or background. . . "), aff'd, 895 F.2d 352
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 (1990).
36. FED. R. EviD. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note.
37. 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (holding that reports made only in anticipation of
litigation not admissible at trial because they are not reliable).
38. FED. R. EvmD. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note.
39. See, e.g., Foster v. General Motors Corp., 20 F.3d 838, 839 (8th Cir.
1994) (per curiam) (stating that police officer's investigative report of accident
was admissible under Rule 803(8) because "[tlhe officer was experienced in
motor vehicle accident investigations, he conducted a neutral investigation
shortly after the accident occurred, and he prepared his report the next day").
1994]
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excluding public records as being untrustworthy falls upon the
opponent of the evidence. 40
With regard to what constitutes a "factual finding" as stated in
Rule 803(8)(C), there was a clear division between the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees on its definition. In enacting Rule
803(8)(C), the House Judiciary Committee interpreted "factual
findings" narrowly to include only factual evaluations. 4 1
However, the Senate construed the phrase "factual findings" to
encompass evaluative reports including opinions made by the
public official.42 In order to alleviate the controversy developing
between the circuit courts and the initial House and Senate
Judiciary Reports, the Supreme Court, in Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey,4 3 held that "factually based conclusions or opinions are
not... excluded from the scope of Rule 803(8)(C). " 44 A further
development of this issue, as well as its application to Rule
803(8)(C) in criminal matters, will follow when comparing Rule
Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying four
factors of trustworthiness to investigative police report and upholding
admissibility of report under Rule 803(8)(C)).
40. Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating that party opposing the admission of a public record is responsible for
putting forth evidence that "enough negative factors" exist to make the record
untrustworthy).
41. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973). The House
Judiciary Committee intended the term "factual findings" to "be strictly
construed and that evaluations or opinions in the report shall not be admissible
under this Rule." Id.
42. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974). The Senate
disagreed with the narrow interpretation given by the House Judiciary
Committee. The committee report states that since various kinds of evaluative
reports are already admissible under appropriate Federal statutes "[t]he
willingness of Congress to recognize these and other such evaluative reports
provides a helpful guide in determining the kind of reports which are intended
to be admissible under this rule." Id.
43. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
44. Id. at 162. In Beech Aircraft, the Supreme Court concluded that
"neither the language of the Rule nor the intent of its framers calls for a
distinction between 'fact' and 'opinion'. . . ." id. at 168.
202 [Vol 11
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803(8)(C) with the applicable New York public records exception
to the hearsay rule.45
B. New York's Public Record Exception to the Hearsay Rule
Although there is no statutory compilation of New York
evidence, New York has recognized an exception to the hearsay
rule pertaining to public documents. 4 6 Public records created by
public officials can be admitted at trial through one of two
avenues of New York law. 47 Where a public record does not fall
within one area of law, courts will often look to the remaining
avenue in order to receive the document into evidence. 48
1. New York Statutory Rule
The first avenue in which public records may be an exception
to the hearsay rule is more narrow than the second one. Section
4520 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules [hereinafter CPLR]
creates a hearsay exception for certain records prepared by public
officers. 49 In general, in order for a public record to qualify
under CPLR 4520, it must be in the form of a certificate or
affidavit and the public officer must be required or authorized by
law to make this certificate or affidavit as to facts ascertained or
45. See infra notes 85-197 and accompanying text.
46. JEROME PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 342. at 308-09 (10th
ed. 1973).
47. See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
48. People v. Kollore, 151 Misc. 2d 384, 573 N.Y.S.2d 357 (City Ct.
Mount Vernon County 1991) (determining that Department of Motor Vehicles
abstract of defendant's driving record was admissible under CPLR 4520 and
common law public records exception).
49. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4520 (McKinney 1992). CPLR 4520
provides:
Where a public officer is required or authorized, by special provision of
law, to make a certificate or an affidavit to a fact ascertained, or an act
performed, by him in the course of his official duty, and to file or
deposit it in a public office of the state, the certificate or affidavit so
filed or deposited is prima facie evidence of the facts stated.
1994] 203
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acts performed by him or her in the midst of official duty. 50
Moreover, the public officer must be required or authorized to
file or deposit the record "in a public office of the state." 5 1
Once the prerequisites of CPLR 4520 are satisfied, the record
will be "prima facie evidence" of the truth of the matters
asserted. 52 Although the statute requires the public record to be
prima facie evidence of the facts asserted, the New York Court
of Appeals, in People v. Mertz,53 held that prima facie evidence
merely creates a permissive inference which the jury is free to
reject, even in the absence of opposing evidence. 54 Furthermore,
where a public record has qualified under CPLR 4520,
foundation testimony appears to be unnecessary based on such
strict requirements. Yet, where foundation testimony is required,
courts may elect to take judicial notice of the laws pursuant to
which the public record was created. 55
50. Id.
51. Id. See In re Zurich-American Ins. Co., 89 A.D.2d 542, 543, 452
N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (holding that Department of Motor Vehicles form should
not have been admissible under CPLR 4520 since "[tihe Commissioner of the
Department of Motor Vehicles is not mandated to file the result of an
insurance search 'in a public office of the state' . .
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
53. 68 N.Y.2d 136, 497 N.E.2d 657, 506 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1986).
54. Id. at 148, 497 N.E.2d at 663, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 296-97. In Mertz, the
New York Court of Appeals stated that "[piresumptive evidence, is, however,
like the prima facie evidence to which CPLR 4518(c) refers, evidence which
permits but does not require the trier of fact to find in accordance with the
'presumed' fact, even though no contradictory evidence has been presented."
Id. at 148, 497 N.E.2d at 663, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 297. Thus, the court of
appeals held that a jury was not required to accept a public official's report that
a breathalyzer test was properly functioning. Id. at 148-49, 497 N.E.2d at 664,
506 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
55. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 4511(a) (McKinney 1992). Section
45 1 (a) states:
Every court shall take judicial notice without request of the common
law, constitutions and public statutes of the United States and of every
state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States and of the official
compilation of codes, rules and regulations of the state except those that
relate solely to the organization or internal management of an agency of
the state and of all local laws and county acts.
204 [Vol 11
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Since the New York Court of Appeals has never truly defined
the scope of CPLR 4520 and given the difficulty in satisfying its
many conditions, many public records are admissible hearsay
under the broader common law rule.56
2. New York Common Law Rule
Richards v. Robin57 was one of the earliest cases to succinctly
define the common law rule pertaining to public documents.
[A]n official statement kept or prepared by or under the direction
of a public officer, acting under his oath of office, either
pursuant to a positive requirement of statute or in the discharge
of a public duty, is competent prima facie evidence as against all
the world of such facts therein stated as the official was required
or authorized by law to state. 58
Thus, in Richards the court upheld the admission of books and
reports of a governmental agency under the common law
exception. 5 9
Under the common law rule, although the public official who
created the report need not take the stand and testify, the public
document must still be authenticated to be that which it purports
to be. 60 However, in contrast to CPLR 4520,61 once the public
document has satisfied the common law requirements, the record
is not prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. 62
56. For explanation and cases stating the common law basis in admitting
public records as an exception to the hearsay rule, see cases cited supra note 3.
57. 178 A.D. 535, 165 N.Y.S. 780 (1st Dep't 1917).
58. Id. at 539, 165 N.Y.S. at 784.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., People v. Garneau, 120 A.D.2d 112, 507 N.Y.S.2d 931
(4th Dep't 1986) (holding that failure to authenticate documents which stated
that breathalyzer test was properly functioning when given to defendant was
error).
61. Section 4520 of the CPLR states that a certificate or affidavit filed by a
public officer is "prima facie evidence of the facts stated." N.Y. Ctv. PRAc.
L. & R. 4520 (McKinney 1992).
62. See Consolidated Midland Corp. v. Columbia Pharmaceutical Corp.,
42 A.D.2d 601, 345 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (2d Dep't 1973) (determining that
under common law hearsay exception for public documents, such documents
1994] 205
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The statutory provisions of the New York public records
exception do not supersede the common law rule. 63 Thus, in
Consolidated Midland Corp. v. Columbia Pharmaceutical
Corp.,64 the Appellate Division, Second Department found that
while certain exhibits did not qualify under CPLR 4520, such
exhibits should have been admitted under the common law rule
since "[tihe common-law rule ... has not been superseded by
CPLR 4520."65
Therefore, the second avenue that may be taken to introduce
public records into evidence under a hearsay exception is the
common law exception as stated in Richards.
C. New York's Business Record Exception to the Hearsay Rule
In New York as opposed to federal practice, many public
records which would otherwise be inadmissible under both the
common law public records exception and the narrow CPLR
4520, are ultimately admissible under the business records
exception contained in section 4518 of the CPLR. 66
"will not be 'prima facie evidence of the facts' contained in them, but merely
some evidence which the trier of the facts is free to disbelieve even though the
adverse party offers no evidence on the point").
63. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4543 (McKinney 1992). CPLR 4543
states: "Nothing in this article [Art. 45, Evidence] prevents the proof of a fact
or a writing by any method authorized by any applicable statute or by the rules
of evidence at common law." Id.
64. 42 A.D.2d 601, 345 N.Y.S.2d 105 (2d Dep't 1973).
65. Id. at 601, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
66. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4518 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994).
Section 4518 provides in pertinent part:
Rule 4518 Business records
(a) Generally. Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in
a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act,
transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence in
proof of that act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the judge
finds that it was made in the regular course of any business and
that it was the regular course of such business to make it, at the
time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a
reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the making
of the memorandum or record, including lack of personal
knowledge by the maker, may be proved to affect its weight, but
206 [Vol 11
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Traditionally, the business records exception applied only to
mercantile "shop books." 67 More recently, however, New York
courts have expanded this exception to include public records, 68
such as police reports. 69
they shall not affect its admissibility. The term business includes a
business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind ....
(c) Other records. All records, writings and other things referred to in
sections 2306, 2307 ... are admissible in evidence under this rule
and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained, provided they
bear a certification or authentication by the head of the hospital,
laboratory, department or bureau of a municipal corporation or of
the state, or by an employee delegated for that purpose ....
Id.
67. Id. practice commentary. The business record exception originated
from the "shop book" rule of the English common law courts. See generally 5
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ON TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1518
(James H. Chadbourn ed., 1974). The shop book rule eventually allowed
shopkeepers, who maintained their own books and records, to admit records of
their business at trial regularly kept by third persons who had since died.
MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 305, at 871. In New York, the shop book rule
was expanded to apply only to transactions in the ordinary course of buying
and selling. Smith v. Rentz, 131 N.Y. 169, 30 N.E. 54 (1892). It did not
apply to books of a corporation. Congdon & Aylesworth Co. v. Sheehan, 11
A.D. 456, 112 N.Y.S. 255 (3d Dep't 1896). Under present law, regularly kept
business records and reports are generally admissible under CPLR 4518.
68. See, e.g., In re Zurich-American Ins. Co., 89 A.D.2d 542, 452
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1st Dep't 1982) (holding that lower court erred in not
considering whether Department of Motor Vehicles form was admissible under
the business records exception after determining form was not a public record
pursuant to CPLR 4520); People v. Hoats, 102 Misc. 2d 1004, 425 N.Y.S.2d
497 (County Ct. Monroe County 1980) (considering CPLR §§ 4518(c), 4520,
and common lav public records exception to determine whether documents
concerning breathalyzer test were admissible hearsay).
69. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Academy Broadway Corp., 198 A.D.2d 641,
642, 603 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (3d Dep't 1993) ("The police report is hearsay
but... it is admissible under the business record exception of CPLR 4518(a)
inasmuch as the witnesses who gave the statements were police officers at the
scene with a duty to report their observations to the recording officer."):
Bracco v. MABSTOA, 117 A.D.2d 273, 502 N.Y.S.2d 158 (lst Dep't 1986)
(holding police reports made in regular course of business admissible under
CPLR 4518); Jones v. Gelinean, 154 Misc. 2d 930. 932, 587 N.Y.S.2d 99.
101 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1992) ("A police report is clearly a business
record, as the police officer preparing such report is under a business duty to
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Thus, CPLR 4518 provides yet another route to admit public
records into evidence that may not have been admissible under
the public record exception.
II. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FEDERAL AND NEW
YORK APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
EXCEPTION
A. Minor Distinctions
In general, rules governing the admissibility of public records
in both federal and New York courts are distinct. In a federal
courthouse, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) is all that an
attorney needs to consider when dealing with the admissibility of
public records as a hearsay exception. 70 Rule 803(8) is all-
encompassing since it provides for a public record to be offered
into evidence as admissible hearsay when that public record sets
forth (1) an activity of a public office; (2) matters observed by a
public official who is under a duty of law to report such activity;
or (3) factual findings in the form of investigative reports. 7 1 Rule
803(8)(B) also provides a stipulation that public records are
inadmissible hearsay in criminal cases where the government is
using the public record against a criminal defendant. 72
However, in contrast to the federal exception, New York takes
a more narrow approach and provides little opportunity for
admitting public records into evidence under a public records
investigate the subject at the report and memorialize the details thereof."). But
see Stevens v. Kirby, 86 A.D.2d 391, 450 N.Y.S.2d 607 (4th Dep't 1982)
(holding investigative police report inadmissible under CPLR 4518 since issues
of fact were not within the personal knowledge of the police).
70. See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 295, at 507 (discussing admissibility
of public records in federal court only under Rule 803(8)).
71. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 (2d Cir. 1977) ("We thus think it manifest that it was
the clear intention of Congress to make evaluative and law enforcement reports
absolutely inadmissible against defendants in criminal cases.").
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exception. 73 The public records exception in New York is based
on only two sources; section 4520 of the CPLR, which is
extremely restrictive, 74 and common law. 75 In contrast to
Federal Rule 803(8), most public records filed by public officials
are admitted into evidence under New York's business record
exception rather than New York's public record exception. 76
Therefore, CPLR 451877 is the most common mechanism that a
New York attorney will utilize when seeking to admit public
records under a hearsay exception. For example, under Rule
803(8) most police reports are admissible into evidence under the
public records exception, 78 however, in New York, police
reports are generally admitted into evidence under the business
records exception. 79
73. See, e.g., In re Eighth Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 152 Misc. 2d
338, 576 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1991) (relying upon a strict
interpretation of CPLR 4520 as basis for not admitting Environmental
Protection Agency report on asbestos).
74. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text; see also People v.
D'Agostino, 120 Misc. 2d 437, 442, 465 N.Y.S.2d 834, 839 (County Ct.
Monroe County 1983) ("[W]hen a public officer is authorized by the nature of
his official duties to keep records during the course of his duties, the record so
made is admissible in evidence.").
76. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Academy Broadway Corp., 194 A.D.2d 641,
603 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dep't 1993) (holding that public record is admissible
under business record exception rather than public record exception).
77. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
78. See Simmons v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 993 F.2d 1326
(8th Cir. 1993) (admitting state trooper's report into evidence under public
documents exception); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding
police report admissible under public records exception in negligence suit
against police officer); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977)
(stating that police reports not qualifying under public documents exception
may not be admissible under business records exception).
79. See, e.g., Bracco v. MABSTOA, 117 A.D.2d 273. 502 N.Y.S.2d 158
(1st Dep't 1986) (holding police reports admissible only under business records
exception); Jones v. Gelineau, 154 Misc. 2d 930, 932. 587 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1992) (stating that police reports are "clearly a
business record. . ").
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One slight difference that should be mentioned briefly concerns
foundation testimony. 80 In general, both Federal Rule 803(8) and
New York's public records exception to the hearsay rule require
foundation testimony. 81 Moreover, it is possible for courts to
take judicial notice of the nature of the records and eliminate the
requirement of foundation testimony. 82 Where the difference lies,
however, is in Section 4520 of the CPLR.83 Under this section,
if a certificate or affidavit is prepared by a public official and the
certificate indicates on its face that the official has ascertained
facts or performed acts described in the record in the course of
his duty and filed in a public office, foundation testimony is
unnecessary. 84 Thus, it appears that where all of the elements of
CPLR 4520 are satisfied, foundation testimony is not required.
B. Major Distinctions
There are two major distinctions between federal and New
York practice regarding the admissibility of public records which
require closer examination. The distinctions involve the treatment
of governmental investigative reports, and the introduction of
80. Foundation testimony consists of a series of preliminary questions to a
witness which are necessary to establish the admissibility of evidence. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 656 (6th ed. 1990). "'Laying foundation' is a prerequisite to
the admission of evidence at trial. It is established by testimony which
identifies the evidence sought to be admitted and connects it with the issue in
question." Id.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542 (3d Cir.) (holding
foundation testimony sufficient to admit IRS computer printouts into evidence
under the federal public records exception), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975);
People v. Gower, 42 N.Y.2d 117, 366 N.E.2d 69, 397 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1977)
(stating breathalyzer test is admissible hearsay under public records exception
provided that proper foundation is met).
82. See People v. Kollore, 151 Misc. 2d 384, 573 N.Y.S.2d 357 (City Ct.
Mount Vernon County 1991) (stating that certificate of Department of Motor
Vehicle containing abstract of defendant's driving record need not require
foundation testimony because court took judicial notice that abstract was
prepared pursuant to specific provision of Vehicle & Traffic Law).
83. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
84. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4520 practice commentary (McKinney
1992).
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police records under a public records exception to the hearsay
rule.
1. Governmental Investigative Reports Containing Opinions
and Conclusions
One of the major differences between Rule 803(8) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and New York's public records
exception to hearsay concerns governmental investigative reports.
Most importantly, the difference lies in New York's reluctance to
admit reports that contain opinions and conclusions. 85 While
under Rule 803(8)(C), "factual findings resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law" 86 are
admissible when such findings include opinions, 87 under the New
York law, such reports are not admissible. 88
The focal point of discussion begins with the Supreme Court
case, Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey.89 In Beech Aircraft, a
Navy training airplane crashed killing the two pilots aboard the
aircraft. 90 The surviving spouses brought suit against the
manufacturer of the plane and Beech Aerospace Services, the
85. See, e.g.. Stevens v. Kirby, 86 A.D.2d 391, 450 N.Y.S.2d 607 (4th
Dep't 1982) (holding state liquor authority's investigation report containing
opinions and conclusions regarding history of disturbances at tavern
inadmissible).
86. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Simmons v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 993
F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1993) (receiving into evidence under Rule 803(8)(C).
investigatory report of car accident containing police officer's opinion about
cause of accident); United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding foreign judgments containing opinions admissible under Rule
803(8)(C)).
88. See, e.g., Stevens, 86 A.D.2d at 391, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 607 (holding
opinion of disturbances by police officer inadmissible).
89. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
90. Id. at 156. The crash took place during training exercises. Id. After its
"fourth pass at the runway," the plane turned left prematurely. -cutting out the
aircraft ahead of it in the pattern and threatening a collision." Id. The plane.
which carried Rainey, a Navy flight instructor, and her student. lost altitude
after trying to avoid a collision with another aircraft and eventually -crashed
and burned." Id.
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company which was contracted to service the plane. 9 1 At trial the
dispute involved the issue of whether the crash was caused by
pilot error or whether an equipment malfunction led to the
crash. 92 Evidence included "an investigative report prepared by
Lieutenant Commander William Morgan on order of the training
squadron's commanding officer and pursuant to authority granted
in the Manual of the Judge Advocate General." 93 At trial, the
judge admitted most of the "opinions" prepared by the Lieutenant
with a few exceptions. 94 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed this ruling, holding that Rule 803(8)(C) "did not
encompass evaluative conclusions or opinions." 95 Thus, the issue
before the Supreme Court was whether or not Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(8)(C) applies to conclusions and opinions contained
in a public investigative report. 96
The Supreme Court stated that Rule 803(8)(C) should be
interpreted broadly and held that opinions and conclusions
contained in "factual finding" reports are also admissible
hearsay. 97 The Court examined several areas of the law in
resolving this issue. 98 First, the Court discussed the language of
91. Id.
92. Id. at 157.
93. Id. This report contained sections on "finding of fact," "opinions,"
and "recommendations." Id.
94. Id. at 159. The judge would not admit the Lieutenant's reconstruction
of what may have occurred minutes before the crash. Id.
95. Id. at 160.
96. Id. at 156.
97. Id. at 162. Prior to Beech Aircraft, the circuit courts were split as to
whether opinions fell under Rule 803(8)(C). Id. at 161. The minority of
circuits have followed the "narrow" approach, interpreting "factual findings"
to not include opinions. See Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.
1980) (reasoning that since both terms are used in same rule, Congress
intended for the terms to have separate and distinct meanings). The majority of
circuits now adhere to a broader meaning of "factual findings" which includes
opinions and conclusions; see also Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720,
726 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 918 (1986); Perrin v. Anderson, 784
F.2d 1040, 1046-47 (10th Cir. 1986); Ellis v. International Playtex Inc., 745
F.2d 292, 300-01 (4th Cir. 1984); Melville v. American Home Assurance Co.,
584 F.2d 1306, 1315-16 (3d Cir. 1978).
98. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 161-70.
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Rule 803(8) and found that the rule itself does not create a
dichotomy between "facts" and "opinions." 9 9 Second, the Court
stated that the legislative history does not explain how Rule
803(8)(C) should be interpreted. The House Judiciary Committee
and the Senate Committee each interpreted the phrase "factual
findings" differently, with the former allowing opinions and the
latter excluding them.100 The Court in Beech Aircraft, believed
that the Senate's interpretation was in accord with the language of
Rule 803(8).101 Third, upon examination of the Advisory
Committee's Note, the Court found that the committee did not
even consider whether opinions were to be included within the
definition of "factual findings." 102 The Supreme Court noted that
the concern of admitting unreliable opinion evidence into
evidence was unfounded since all evaluative reports must also
satisfy Rule 803(8)(C)'s requirement of trustworthiness. 10 3 Thus,
all three sources support the holding in Beech Aircraft that the
Lieutenant's evaluative report was rightfully admitted as a public
record exception to the hearsay rule.
"As long as the conclusion is based on a factual investigation
and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness requirement, " 104 Beech
99. Id. at 163-64. The Supreme Court stated that "it is not apparent that
the term 'factual findings' should be read to mean simply 'facts' .... " Id.
Moreover, the Court noted that a common definition of "factual findings"
includes conclusions as well as facts. Id. at 164.
100. Id. at 164-65. The House Judiciary Committee wrote in its report on
Rule 803(8) in pertinent part: "The Committee intends that the phrase 'factual
findings' be strictly construed and that evaluations or opinions contained in
public reports shall not be admissible under this Rule." H.R. REP. No. 650,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973).
The Senate Committee, however, disagreed with the definition enunciated by
the House Committee in its report. "The committee takes strong exception to
this limiting understanding [stated by the House Committee] of the application
of the rule .... The committee concludes that the language of the rule
together with the explanation provided by the Advisory Committee furnish
sufficient guidance on the admissibility of evaluative reports." S. REP. No.
1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974).
101. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 165.
102. Id. at 166-67.
103. Id. at 167. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
104. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 167.
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Aircraft now requires federal courts to admit into evidence all
investigatory reports, even those containing conclusions and
opinions. 10 5 Consistent with the Court's ruling, the Sixth Circuit,
in Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp. ,106 held that an investigatory
police report was admissible under Rule 803(8)(C). 107 The court
found that the police officer's opinion as to the color of the traffic
light was "essentially an evaluative opinion resulting from
evidence" 10 8 and was included within Rule 803(8)(C)'s definition
of "factual findings."109 The court examined the report in light
of the trustworthiness factors1 10 and concluded that the police
officer's "own objective finding[s] of facts ... were
admissible." 111
Public reports regarding the cause of an accident have also
been received into evidence in light of Beech Aircraft.112 In
Distaff, Inc. v. Springfield Contracting Corp.,113 the Fourth
Circuit considered whether conclusions stated in a report based
on an investigation into a fire at a Navy facility were admissible
under Rule 803(8)(C). 114 An investigation by the chief fire
inspector was conducted following a fire at plaintiff's job-site. 115
105. Id. at 170. See, e.g., Simmons v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp.
Co., 993 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding police trooper's evaluation of
what caused car accident admissible).
106. 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979).
107. Id. at 557. The police report offered into evidence included a police
officer's opinion that "'apparently unit #2 [a second car involved in the
accident] entered the intersection against a red light.'" Id. at 555.
108. Id. at 557.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
111. Baker, 588 F.2d at 558. The court explained that since the police
officer arrived at the scene minutes after the accident and had investigated
hundreds of car accidents within his official duty, the opinion was trustworthy.
Id.
112. Distaff, Inc. v. Springfield Contracting Corp., 984 F.2d 108 (4th Cir.
1993) (holding that district court's exclusion of fire investigator's report solely
because author could not be questioned about the conclusions and opinions in
the report was error).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 109-10.
115. Id. at 109.
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The report prepared by the fire inspector stated that "a high
impedance short in the electrical power cord of a contractor's air
machine" was the probable cause of the fire. 116 Based on the
decision in Beech Aircraft, the court held that the report and its
opinions should not have been excluded just because the
defendant could not cross-examine the fire inspector about his
opinions.1 17 The court stated that as long as the report was
trustworthy, as defined by the Advisory Committee for Rule
803(8), the opinions were admissible hearsay. 118
In at least one case, a foreign judgment was received into
evidence even though it contained opinions and conclusions. 119
In United States v. Garland, 120 the issue was whether a criminal
judgment rendered by the National Public Tribunal of Ghana was
admissible under the federal public records exception to the
hearsay rule. 12 1 The Sixth Circuit utilized the holding in Beech
Aircraft to determine whether opinions expressed in a foreign
judgment were reliable and trustworthy to qualify under Rule
803(8)(C). 122 The court reasoned that "[a]s with public records,
there is no reason to distinguish between facts and 'opinions'
contained in foreign judgments." 123 Thus, the Ghanian judgment
was admitted as prima facie evidence in the subsequent criminal
action. 124
In New York, however, present law is unclear as to whether
governmental investigative reports containing opinions as well as
factual findings are admissible under the hearsay exception for
public records and reports. New York courts have not yet
adopted the holding in Beech Aircraft, which allows opinions and
116. Id. at 109-10.
117. Id. at 112.
118. Id. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
119. See United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1993).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 330. The judgment that was to be used by the defendant
concerned a conviction of two other men for defrauding the defendant and
making false misrepresentations. Id. at 332. The judgment contained several
pages which "corroborateldi the defendant's claims" in the present action. Id.
122. Id. at 335
123. Id.
124 Id.
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conclusions to be admitted into evidence as part of an
investigatory report. In fact, most decisions refuse to admit any
reports containing opinions. 125 For example, autopsy reports
stating opinions as to the cause of death are generally
inadmissible under the New York public records exception. 126
People v. Violante127 was one such case where the Appellate
Division, Fourth Department held that "while the autopsy
findings are admissible to establish the primary facts stated
therein, opinions as to the cause of death contained in such report
are not admissible." 128 Even prior to the Beech Aircraft decision,
New York courts would not admit opinions into evidence under
the public records exception.129 The case of People v.
Hampton130 is an example of New York's reluctance to admit
opinions and conclusions under the public records exception prior
to Beech Aircraft. The Hampton case also involved autopsy
reports. 13 1 Although, at that time, the court was willing to admit
the factual findings contained in the report, as to opinions, the
court explained, "[o]ur courts have not extended the [public
records exception] to include opinions as to the cause of death
contained in such reports."' 132 The court's main concern in
125. See, e.g., Kelly v. Diesel Constr. Div. of Carl A. Morse Inc., 35
N.Y.2d 1, 8, 315 N.E.2d 751, 754, 358 N.Y.S.2d 685, 690 (1974) (holding
elevator inspector's accident report admissible, however, opinions as to cause
of accident must "qualify independently for admission under a recognized
exception to the hearsay rule").
126. People v. Hampton, 38 A.D.2d 772, 327 N.Y.S.2d 961 (3d Dep't
1972) (extending hearsay exception to include autopsy report but not to include
opinions in report as to cause of death).
127. 144 A.D.2d 995, 534 N.Y.S.2d 281 (4th Dep't 1988).
128. Id. at 996, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 283 (emphasis added).
129. Kelly, 35 N.Y.2d at 8, 315 N.E.2d at 754, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 690
(holding public official's opinion as to cause of accident inadmissible).
130. 38 A.D.2d 772, 327 N.Y.S.2d 961 (3d Dep't 1972).
131. Id. at 773, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 962. The autopsy report stated that "death
was caused by (1) traumatic shock and (2) battered child syndrome." Id.
132. Id. The court, however, did note that admitting the opinions was only
harmless error since there was enough evidence to establish guilt. Id. at 773,
327 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
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Hampton was the defendant's inability to cross-examine the
medical examiner. 133
However, despite the fact that Hampton and Violante involved
criminal matters, New York decisional law still conflicts with the
policies of Rule 803(8)(C) and is reluctant to admit opinion
evidence in civil actions where governmental investigations
occur. 134 For example, in Stevens v. Kirby135 the issue on appeal
concerned the admissibility of a New York State Liquor
Authority investigative report regarding a disturbance at a
tavern. 136 The investigative report included police reports of
prior incidents, examinations of previous court records and more
importantly, a general opinion that the owner of the tavern could
not control his patrons. 137 The appellate court, however,
disagreed with the lower court's decision to admit the report into
evidence because "ultimate issues of facts [were] not within the
personal knowledge of the [investigators]." 138 Although Stevens
referred to the report as a business record and not a public
record, the court still found that "[tihe opinions of the individual
deputies summarized by the Liquor Authority investigator are
conclusions which only the jury could draw after having heard
the evidence." 139
Such a categorical exclusion of opinions by New York is in
contrast to federal practice. 140 New York courts should consider
admitting opinions under its public records exception just as the
federal courts do under the federal public records exception in the
wake of Beech Aircraft. It appears that New York has forgotten
the basis for admitting such reports into evidence, namely the
presumed trustworthiness of those public officials preparing the
133. Id. at 773, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
134. See Kelly v. Diesel Constr. Div. of Carl A. Morse Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 1,
315 N.E.2d 751, 358 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1974) (holding elevator inspector's
accident report regarding cause of accident inadmissible).
135. 86 A.D.2d 391, 450 N.Y.S.2d 607 (4th Dep't 1982).
136. Id. at 391-92, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
137. Id. at 393, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
138. Id. at 395, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
139. Id. at 396, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
140. See supra notes 85-124 and accompanying text.
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reports. Kozlowski v. City of Amsterdam, 14 1 however, is one
such case which may be the impetus for admitting evaluative
reports with opinions in the future. In Kozlowski, the Appellate
Division, Third Department held that a medical review
commissioner's report on the cause of death of an inmate was
admissible under the common law public record exception to the
hearsay rule. 142 The court explained that "[s]ince the report was
properly prepared and clearly relevant, plaintiff had a right to
have it admitted into evidence." 14 3
2. Police Records
Another contrast between the public records exception under
Federal Rule 803(8) and section 4520 of New York's CPLR
involves police reports. 14 4 Specifically, police reports are usually
treated as admissible hearsay in federal courts under the federal
public records exception, Rule 803(8). 145 In New York,
however, these same reports and records are exceptions to the
hearsay rule and are treated as business records rather than public
records. 14 6 Although there are distinctions between the two rules,
141. 111 A.D.2d 476, 488 N.Y.S.2d 862 (3d Dep't 1985).
142. Id. at 478, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
143. Id.
144. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4518 practice commentary (McKinney
1992). "In contrast to the approach taken in federal practice ... records of the
police and other law enforcement agencies are often admitted in New York
criminal prosecutions pursuant to CPLR 4518(a) [business records exception]
rather than the hearsay exceptions for public records provided by CPLR 4520
and the common law." Id.
145. See, e.g., Foster v. General Motors Corp., 20 F.3d 838 (8th Cir.
1994) (concluding that investigative police report falls under public records
exception); Simmons v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 993 F.2d 1326
(8th Cir. 1993) (stating that police report of accident containing officer's
conclusions was admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) in civil suit); Baker v.
Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 1978) ("A police report is,
in our judgment, a 'public record and report' within the meaning of the first
part of Rule 803(8)."), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979).
146. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Academy Broadway Corp., 198 A.D.2d 641,
603 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dep't 1993) (holding police report admissible under
business record exception); Leonick v. City of New York, 120 A.D.2d 573,
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one principle that is treated in a similar manner in both New
York and federal practice is the adherence to a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation, 147 which will be discussed
later. 148 This Comment submits that New York's treatment of
police records and reports can lead to serious implications,
including a conflict with the Second Circuit's holding in United
States v. Oates. 149
Before examining these implications, a brief discussion of the
distinct treatment of police reports in both federal and New York
practice is warranted. Police reports are implicitly covered by
Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In civil actions,
police reports can fall squarely within the definition of Rule
803(8)(B) when the police officers have observed matters
-pursuant to a duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report." 150 Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp.15 1
502 N.Y.S.2d 60 (2d Dep't 1986) (stating that police reports were admissible
under business records exception); Bracco v. MABSTOA, 117 A.D.2d 273,
502 N.Y.S.2d 158 (lst Dep't 1986) (holding police report made in regular
course of business admissible as business record); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Bermudez, 111 A.D.2d 858, 490 N.Y.S.2d 595 (2d Dep't 1985)
(stating that police accident report was properly received into evidence under
business record exception); Jones v. Gelineau, 154 Misc. 2d 930, 932, 587
N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1992) ("A police report is clearly
a business record .... ").
147. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ." Id.
148. See infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
149. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977). In the Second Circuit. under Oaes.
hearsay statements as to investigative findings, including police reports and
records, may not be introduced against a criminal defendant under the business
records exception when the public record exception does not apply. Id. at 75.
The Fifth Circuit has relied on Oaes in holding that police reports which are
inadmissible as public records under Rule 803(8) cannot then be received into
evidence under the business record exception. United States v. Cain. 615 F.2d
380, 381 (5th Cir. 1980). The court stated that although the police report may
qualify under the business record exception, it was nevertheless inadmissible
since it was within the exception to Rule 803(8)(B) as a matter observed by
law enforcement personnel. Id. at 381-82.
150. FED. R. EvID. 803(8). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
151. 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979).
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similarly states that "[a] police report is ... a 'public record and
report' 152 and direct observations of police officers are clearly
"matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law" in which
there is a duty to report. 153 Other circuit courts have confirmed
the reasoning expressed in Baker. 154 Thus, under federal
practice, police reports are generally admissible under the public
records exception and not the business record exception.
In contrast with federal practice, New York has treated police
reports and records in civil or criminal matters as business
records. 155 It is submitted that such treatment is based on the fact
that New York's public record exception is extremely narrow,
limiting what is admissible as a public record. Since it is difficult
to admit into evidence public records under the public record
exception, police reports are generally received into evidence
under the more lenient business record exception.
In Lindsay v. Academy Broadway Corp.,156 the Appellate
Division, Third Department, held that the lower court was
correct in admitting a police report under the business record
exception to the hearsay rule since "the witnesses who gave the
statements [of the events observed] were police officers at the
scene with a duty to report their observations to the recording
officer." 157 This report, however, would be inadmissible under
the New York public records exception because there was no
certificate or affidavit from the police officer.
In Bracco v. MABSTOA, 158 over a hearsay objection, the
Appellate Division, First Department, admitted into evidence
pages of a police officer's memo book and accident report
152. Id. at 556.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Foster v. General Motors Corp., 20 F.3d 838 (8th Cir.
1994) (per curiam) (holding police report prepared by investigating police
officer who was experienced in accident investigations admissible under public
records exception).
155. Police records may also be admissible under the more narrow New
York statutory public record exception. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4520
(McKinney 1992).
156. 198 A.D.2d 641, 603 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dep't 1993).
157. Id. at 641, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
158. 117 A.D.2d 273, 502 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1st Dep't 1986).
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prepared by the police officer. 159 The court admitted the records
as business records rather than as public records reasoning that
"[a]ll of these entries were made in the regular course of
business, and it was the duty of the police officer.. . to include
them in his reports." 160
People v. Jones,16 1 for example, demonstrates how a police
record in New York is admissible under the business record
exception in criminal matters. 162 In Jones, the court upheld the
admissibility of a speedometer test record prepared by the
police. 163 However, the court noted that although the
speedometer record did not satisfy the public records exception
because it was "not deposited in a public office[,]" 164 it was
"indicative ... of the trend to admit [these] official records [as
business records since they were] kept in the regular course of
business." 165
Thus, because New York's public record exception is so
restrictive, most police reports and records are ultimately
admissible into evidence as business records. This is in contrast
to federal practice where police records are treated as public
records. Moreover, since New York's public record exception
does not require the exclusion of police records in actions against
criminal defendants, unlike Rule 803(8), it is not surprising that
so many police records are classified as business records and
used against criminal defendants in New York. 166
159. Id. at 277, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
160. Id. See Jones v. Gelineau, 154 Misc. 2d 930, 932, 587 N.Y.S.2d 99,
101 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1992) ("A police report is clearly a business
record, as the police officer preparing such report is under a business duty to
investigate the subject of the report and memorialize the details thereof.").
161. 10 Misc. 2d 1067, 171 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Magistrate's Ct. Queens
County 1958).
162. Id. at 1075, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1073-74, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 144-65 and accompanying text.
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a. Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation
One principle that is treated similarly in both New York and
federal practice is a defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation. No matter how police reports and records are
categorized in New York or in federal courts, one principle that
still may override the admissibility of such reports is a
defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment. 167
Although a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation, public records have nevertheless been admissible
against a criminal defendant. 168 The reason for receiving such
reports into evidence without the need for a police officer to
testify is based on the notion that "certain hearsay exceptions rest
upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any
evidence within them comports with the 'substance of the
constitutional protection."' 169 Since business and public records
are both considered reliable hearsay exceptions, such reports are
usually admissible without the need for a defendant to confront
the person who prepared them. 170
New York courts follow federal practice in admitting public
reports into evidence despite the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation. 17 1 For example, a crime laboratory report
identifying heroin as a substance found on the defendant was held
167. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ." Id. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980) (recognizing defendant's constitutional right to confront
witnesses); People v. Nisonoff, 293 N.Y. 597, 59 N.E.2d 420 (1944), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 745 (1945).
168. See Nisonoff, 293 N.Y. 597, 59 N.E.2d 420 (1944).
169. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 244 (1895)).
170. Id.
171. See Nisonoff, 293 N.Y. at 601-02, 59 N.E.2d at 421-22 (stating that
police autopsy report was admissible and consistent with defendant's right to
confrontation); People v. Reese, 258 N.Y. 89, 96, 179 N.E. 305, 306 (1932)
("The rule of confrontation ... has never been deemed to require the
exclusion of certificates or records made by a public officer in the course of
his official duty.").
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admissible against the criminal defendant in In re Kevin G. 172
Furthermore, a police ballistics report was received into evidence
concerning the operability of a gun found in possession of a
juvenile in In re Nelson. 173
New York's public record or business record exception,
however, has given way to a defendant's right to confrontation
when a police report contains a subjective interpretation of facts
or identifies a defendant as a criminal participant. 174 For
example, in People ex rel. McGee v. Walters, 175 an issue arose
as to whether a parolee has a due process right to confront
adverse witnesses whose statements made in a public report are
offered into evidence at a parole revocation hearing. 176 The New
York Court of Appeals first noted that a defendant's right to
confrontation is not absolute. 177 In a parole revocation hearing,
the court recognized that the principle of confrontation is to
ensure the enhancement of the fact-finding process "when the
recollections of the witness may be tested and his or her
172. 80 Misc. 2d 517, 521-22, 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004 (Fam. Ct. N.Y.
County 1975). The court in hI re Kevin G. examined other jurisdictions and
found that several other courts have admitted drug content reports prepared by
police chemists despite a defendant's wish to confront the public official who
has prepared the report. Id.
173. 83 Misc. 2d 1081, 1084, 374 N.Y.S.2d 982, 986 (Fam. Ct. Bronx
County 1975). The court, in hI re Nelson, also stated that -the reporter who
signs a routine ballistics report on operability, if called to the witness stand.
has no recollection whatever of the reported test; Itherefore. his testimony
lonlyl consists of his reading the report aloud." Id.
174. See, e.g., People ea rel. McGee v. Walters. 62 N.Y.2d 317. 465
N.E.2d 342, 476 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1984). Under the federal public records
exception, police reports containing subjective statements or identifications of a
defendant have also been excluded as violating a defendant's right to
confrontation. United States v. Agustino-Hernandez. 14 F.3d 42. 43 (11th Cir.
1994) (per curiam) ("[Tihis court has recognized that the public records
exception IRule 803(8)1 does not exclude police records 'prepared in a routine
non adversarial setting,' as it does 'those resulting from a more subjective
investigation and evaluation of a crime.'" (quoting United States v. Brown. 9
F.3d 907. 911 (11 th Cir. 1993) (per curiam))).
175. 62 N.Y.2d 317. 465 N.E.2d 342, 476 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1984).
176. Id. at 319, 465 N.E.2d at 343, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
177. Id. at 321-22. 465 N.E.2d at 344. 476 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
1994]
29
Simanoff: Public Records
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
demeanor may be evaluated through cross-examination." 178
Thus, the court did not admit a parole officer's report of parole
violations by the parolee, because the hearing officer did not
consider the "policies favoring confrontation, the objective or
subjective nature of the particular report, and the potential
assistance that cross-examination would lend to the fact-finding
process .. "..,, 179
Hence, what seems to be a necessary requirement when
admitting police reports against a criminal defendant is an
individualized evaluation of the respective report and the
circumstances under which it was prepared. Both federal and
New York practice are correct in examining public records in this
light when dealing with the delicate subject of a defendant's right
to confrontation.
b. United States v. Oates Ruling
One serious implication arising from New York's treatment of
police reports as a business record rather than as public records,
involves the ruling in United States v. Oates.180 Although
Oates's principle regarding public records is not controlling for
all of the federal courts, 18 1 it was the first case to consider
whether police reports can be introduced against a criminal
defendant under the business record exception when such reports
178. Id. at 322, 465 N.E.2d at 344-45, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
179. Id.
180. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
181. See Daniel F. Sullivan, Annotation, Admissibility, Over Hearsay
Objection, of Police Observations and Investigative Findings Offered by
Government in Criminal Prosecution, Excluded from Public Records Exception
to Hearsay Rule under Rule 803(8)(B) or (C), Federal Rules of Evidence, 56
A.L.R. FED. 168 (1982) (discussing other circuits ruling on whether
investigative findings and observations of public officials may be admitted
under other hearsay exceptions when excluded from public records exception);
see also United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.) (admitting certified
affidavits of CIA officials against criminal defendant under Rule 803(10)),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979); United States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190
(7th Cir. 1979) (excluding law enforcement personnel's reports under Rule
803(8) does not bar introducing reports under Rule 803(5)), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 943 (1980).
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would not qualify for admission under the public records
exception. 182 One other circuit as well has considered this issue
and has since followed the rationale of Oates. 183
In Oates, the defendant was convicted of possession of heroin
with intent to distribute. 184 On appeal to the Second Circuit the
issue arose as to whether an official report prepared by a United
States Customs Service Chemist, which stated that the white
powdery substance found on the defendant was heroin, was
admissible under any applicable hearsay exception. 185 The
Second Circuit first examined whether the chemist who prepared
the report was considered "other law enforcement personnel" as
defined in Rule 803(8)(B). 186 The court determined that the
United States Chemist qualified as "law enforcement personnel"
since this phrase was now to be construed "to include, at the
least, any officer or employer of a governmental agency which
has law enforcement responsibilities." 187 Thus, the Second
Circuit found that the report, under Rule 803(8)(B), could not be
admissible against the criminal defendant. 188
The question then arose as to whether the report could still be
used against the defendant if it could satisfy another hearsay
exception. 189 After much discussion about the legislative history
of Rule 803(8) and the reasons why Congress decided to exclude
182. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 295, at 508 (stating that United States v.
Oates was first case to decide whether official records could be admitted under
other hearsay exceptions against a criminal defendant when records would be
inadmissible under federal public records exception).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding statements made in official report inadmissible against criminal
defendant under business record exception).
184. Oates, 560 F.2d at 48.
185. Id. at 66.
186. Id. at 67.
187. Id. at 68. The Second Circuit noted that this definition "must be read
broadly enough to make its prohibitions against the use of government-
generated reports in criminal cases coterminous with the analogous prohibitions
contained in FRE 803(8)(C)." Id. at 67-68.
188. Id. at 68.
189. Id. at 68-80.
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such reports when used against a criminal defendant, 190 the
Second Circuit was careful to note that "this was not the first
time that a court has encountered a situation pitting some literal
language of a statute against a legislative intent that flies in the
face of that literal language."' 19 1 The Second Circuit, though,
held that the legislative intent to exclude matters observed by the
police in criminal cases must override the language of any other
hearsay exception. 192
[I]t was thus clear that the only way to construe FRE 803(6) so
that it is reconcilable with this intended effect is to interpret FRE
803(6) and the other hearsay exceptions in such a way that police
and evaluative reports not satisfying the standards of FRE
803(8)(B) and (C) may not qualify for admission under FRE
803(6) or any of the other hearsay exceptions to the hearsay
rule. 193
Thus, the chemist report was inadmissible under the business
record exception as well. 194
How does the Oates decision affect New York's introduction of
police reports under the business record exception against a
criminal defendant? Oates is in direct conflict with New York's
policy of admitting public records under the business record
190. The Second Circuit examined the various Senate and House Judiciary
Committee Reports to determine what was Congress' intent in enacting Rule
803(8)(B) and (C). Id. at 69. Since various Congressional statements discussed
the reaffirmation of an accused right to confrontation, the Second Circuit
explained that "the language retained in FRE 803(8)(B) and (C) meant that
those provisions had the effect of rendering absolutely inadmissible against
defendants in criminal cases the 'police reports' of item (B) and the 'evaluative
reports' of item (C)." Id. at 70-71. Thus, police or evaluative reports were
held inadmissible under any other hearsay exception if such report could not
satisfy Rule 803(8)(B) or (C). Id.
191. Id. at 75.
192. Id. The Second Circuit stated that "[ojur function as an interpretive
body is, of course, to construe legislative enactments in such a way that the
intent of the legislature is carried out." Id.
193. Id. at 77.
194. Id. at 68.
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exception even if they do not satisfy the public record
exception. 195
As discussed previously, police reports which are namely
public records do not necessarily fall under the restrictive New
York public records exception. Rather, they are introduced into
evidence under the business records exception. However, were
such a criminal matter to be brought into the Second Circuit,
such reports would be inadmissible as business records under the
Oates decision if the police reports are inadmissible under the
public records exception. Thus, in federal courts, as opposed to
New York courts, such records could not be admitted into
evidence through other hearsay exceptions. In cases such as In re
Kevin G. 196 and People ex rel. Katz v. Jones,197 where police
records were admissible under the business records exception,
New York law was in direct conflict with the holding in Oates
since the police records which did not qualify under the New
York statutory public records exception were still received into
evidence under the business record exception. The New York
hearsay exception for public records needs now to consider the
concerns addressed in the Oates decision.
III. NEW YORK'S PROPOSED CODE OF EVIDENCE
Should New York adopt a more expansive version of Rule
803(8) and step away from the multi-faceted New York public
records exception'? The New York State Law Revision
Commission believes so. Under the New York Proposed Code of
Evidence, which was submitted to the 1991-92 session of the
New York State Legislature, the Law Revision Commission
proposed a New York public records exception. The proposal
contemplates some of the same concerns addressed by Rule
803(8) as well as some other conditions that have not been
expressed in either the federal or New York public records
195. See THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION CO1MMISSION. A CODE OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 803(c)(7) (1991).
196. 80 Misc. 2d 517, 363 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
197. 10 Misc. 2d 1067, 171 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Magistrate's Ci. Queens
County 1958).
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exception. 198 The New York Proposed Code of Evidence's
public record exception provides as follows:
Records, reports, or other writings or data compilations of public
offices not prepared solely for purposes of litigation setting forth:
(i) the activities of the office; or (ii) matters observed pursuant to
a duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report, except that in a criminal case a law enforcement record
or report offered by the prosecution under this paragraph to
prove directly an element of the crime charged or other crucial
facts establishing guilt is admissible: (a) when the person who
provided the information set forth in the record or report
testifies, or is unavailable to testify within the meaning of
subdivision (a) of section 804 of this article; and (b) when the
record or report contains an expert opinion, if the person who
rendered that opinion testifies, or if that person is unavailable to
testify within the meaning of subdivision (a) of section 804 of
this article and there is available no other witness who can
provide equivalent testimony; or (iii) in civil actions and
proceedings, factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law. 199
The Proposed Code should be adopted in New York because it
contains pertinent clauses not found in either Rule 803(8) or New
York's public records exception. This would ultimately "revive"
the useful public records exception. One important proposal that
the New York Proposed Code considers is the all-important right
of a criminal defendant to confront his or her witnesses. 20 0 Thus,
the Proposed Code allows a public record to be admitted into
evidence against a criminal defendant but only when "the person
who provided the information . . . in the record or report testifies
"201 or "when the record or report contains an expert
198. THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, A CODE OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 803(c)(7), supra note 195, at 184.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 208 ("Still, to protect an accused's state and federal
confrontation rights, subparagraph (B) restricts the admissibility of official law
enforcement reports concerning non routine matters against the accused in
criminal cases in a manner identical to that provided for law enforcement
reports under the business record exception.").
201. Id. at 184.
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opinion, if the person who rendered that opinion
testifies .... ",202 This is the most sound approach when dealing
with any type of record or report where a criminal defendant is
involved. Overall, the New York Proposed Code of Evidence's
public records exception is a wise proposal, which, if adopted,
would clearly improve the fragmented New York public records
exception.
CONCLUSION
The public records exception to the hearsay rule, whether
utilized in federal or New York courts, is a valuable tool and
operates as an important link betveen the administration and
judiciary system by allowing private litigants to take advantage of
a reliable public resource. 203 Although an invaluable tool in
today's courthouse, the New York public record exception, as
compared to Federal Rule 803(8), is difficult to utilize and at
times seems to down-play the basis for admitting such records
into evidence. Furthermore, the organization of New York's
public record exception makes it difficult to apply, especially to
police reports. This Comment concludes that New York's
legislature should take the initiative to revise the intricacies set
forth by the New York public records exception and adopt a rule
similar to that stated in New York's Proposed Code of Evidence;
thus insuring a revival of the public records exception. 204
Randi M. Simanoff
202. Id.
203. Note, The Trusnvorthiness of Government Evaluative Reports Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) (C), 96 HARv. L. REv. 492, 509 (1982).
204. See THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, A CODE OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEv YORK § 803(c)(7), supra note 195, at 184.
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